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ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: THE
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT FEDERAL
REGULATORY MANDATE
Michael Herz*
I. INTRODUCTION

No chapter of the United States Code, nor any part of the Code
of Federal Regulations, is entitled "Environmental Auditing." There
is no Federal Environmental Auditing Act, nor are there any direct
environmental audit requirements. While the Environmental Protec
tion Agency (EPA) has issued an Environmental Auditing Policy
Statement,^ it is carefully limited to the precatory rather than the
mandatory.^ Environmental auditing is, then, voluntary and unregu
lated. Yet it is also inescapably linked to and driven by the regulatory
scheme. Wholly apart from the continuing debate over whether envi
ronmental regulations are too lax or too stringent, their very existence
compels corporate environmental self-assessments. I will discuss the
direct and indirect ways in which the present regulatory scheme re
quires rigorous environmental self-assessment in particular and com
mitted environmental management in general.
In part, I address routine environmental audits: "systematic,
documented, periodic and objective review[s] by regulated entities of
facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental re
quirements."^ But I take environmental auditing to consist of more
than simply compliance auditing; rather, it is the whole range of envi
ronmental information-gathering efforts. Moreover, the ultimate con
cern is not self-assessment but environmental management, or, to put
it plainly, "Now that we have all this information, what are we going
to do with it?" Information is a necessary but not sufficient predicate
of effective environmental management.'* Such management does not
* Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 EPA Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986) [hereinafter
EPA Auditing Policy].
2 For a full discussion of the EPA policy, see Van Cleve, The Changing Intersection of
Environmental Auditing, Environmental Law and Enforcement Policy, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1215 (1991).
3 EPA Auditing Policy, supra note 1, at 25,006.
* Frank Friedman explains:
Auditing is only one aspect of [environmental] management, but it has received
considerable attention as a means of reducing EPA inspections and ensuring legal
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merely ignore or scramble to keep up with regulatory requirements.
It anticipates, helps shape, takes advantage of, and goes beyond those
requirements. The current regulatory scheme rewards such manage
ment, and the rewards will only grow in the future.
When EPA proposed its environmental auditing policy, less than
five years ago, it received a scant thirteen written comments: eight
from private industry, two from trade associations, and one each from
a federal agency, a consulting firm, and a law firm.' Times have
changed—^there now exist an Institute for Environmental Auditing,
an Environmental Auditing Roundtable, a half-dozen book-length
treatments of the subject,® and a constantly growing cadre of profes
sional auditors.^ It seems that another seminar, conference, or how-to
session is held every week. One's initial assumption would be that
this sudden exponential growth reflects some recent regulatory devel
opment. Yet most of the basic regulatory requirements have been in
place for a decade or more.® The more recent emphasis on compre
hensive environmental self-assessment is thus not simply a response to
thorough regulation, which predates it.'
compliance. This focus on auditing alone, without other strong programs and pro
cedures, is misplaced. Auditing can provide only limited control and awareness of
potential issues. An audit is merely a "snapshot" of existing controls at a facility.
Without other management systems, the audit is a very limited part of modem
environmental management.
F. FRIEDMAN, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 63 (2d ed. 1990)
(footnote omitted).
5 EPA Auditing Policy, supra note 1, at 25,004.
® See, e.g., H. BLAKESLEE & T. GARBOWSKI, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PLANT ENVIRON
MENTAL AUDITS (1985); J. GREENO, G. HEDSTROM & M. DIBERTO, ENVIRONMENTAL AU
DITING—FUNDAMENTALS AND TECHNIQUES (1985); R. HALL & D. CASE, ALL ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING (1987); THE MCGRAW-HILL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING
HANDBOOK (L. Harrison ed. 1984); see also F. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4.
' Priznar, Trends in Environmental Auditing, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,179,
10,181 (1990).
® The explosive decade for environmental law, especially at the federal level, was the
1970s. Before 1970, there was virtually no direct federd environmental regulation. In rapid
succession. Congress then enacted The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-43706 (1988)), The
Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1988)), The Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)), The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1988)), The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)), and The Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2303 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2671 (1988)). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia
bility Act (CERCLA or Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)), was the last in this flurry; even it is now 10 years old.
9 The delay between the enactment of thoroughgoing command and control schemes and
the corporate reaction is partially due to the lag time in getting both governmental and private
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To some extent, the new interest is attributable to a significant
increase in the number and size of the penalties, both financial and
personal, for noncomphance. This rise reflects no underlying legal
change, but a more serious enforcement effort coupled with steadily
expanding tort liability.'" Similarly, it took a while for it to become
clear that Superfund imposes liabilities quite as expansive, and expen
sive, as we now know it does.
Perhaps the more important forces, however, have not involved
compliance issues. There has been increasing appreciation of the ben
efits of environmental management other than compliance with a
complicated set of regulations: improved risk management, lower pre
miums or more readily available insurance, good public relations, bet
ter operating performance, sounder planning, and reduced costs
through recycling, waste minimization, and material substitutions,
the opportunity for which would otherwise have gone unnoticed." In
particular, the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act (EPCRA)" and its attendant publicity have significantly
changed the climate in which corporations operate. Without impos
ing any substantive requirements limiting discharges, the right-toknow provisions gave a huge boost to the perceived need for thorough
information on risk and potential health, safety, and environmental
harms. Thus, by focusing on the regulatory scheme, I do not wish to
shght the important factors other than concerns about liability that
are equally or more important spurs to committed environmental
management.
programs up and running. The critical event for the regulated community, after all, is not
passage of a piece of legislation, but the appearance, many years later, of the implementing
regulations. This factor still does not fully explain the relatively late attention to routine envi
ronmental auditing systems.
For example, the past year saw a record $32 million in civil penalties go to the federal
government. EPA recently announced a tougher RCRA enforcement policy, with more fines
at the $25,000 maximum and insistence on each day being a separate violation. 21 Bnv't Rep.
(BNA) 1129 (Oct. 5, 1990). The Department of Justice (DOJ) obtained 134 criminal indict
ments in 1990, the most ever. Id. at 1397 (Nov. 23, 1990). Although still a drop in the bucket,
this marks a critical change from the not-so-distant past when criminal liability for corporate
managers under the environmental laws was a wholly theoretical possibility. On increased tort
liability, see Kannar, The Expansions of Tort Liability for Corporations and Corporate Manag
ers, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1265 (1991).
See Earl, Environmental Auditing: What Your Client Doesn't Know Hurts the Most, 60
FLA. B.J., Jan. 1986, at 47-48; Price & Danzig, Environmental Auditing: Developing a "Preven
tive Medicine" Approach to Environmental Compliance, 19 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1189, 1193-94
(1986).
•2 EPCRA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1100111050 (1988)), formed Title III of the Superfund Reauthorization and Amendments Act of
1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1760 (codified at scattered sections of 10, 26, 29,
33, and 42 U.S.C.), and is accordingly often referred to as "SARA Title III."
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One other point at the outset. Environmental self-assessments
and comprehensive environmental management are not merely re
sponses to the environmental regulatory scheme. They are also criti
cal to shaping regulatory requirements. To be effective in lobbying,
commenting on regulatory proposals, applying for permits, and par
ticipating in the less formal back and forth between regulators and
those they regulate, managers must have a thorough and sophisticated
knowledge of their company's impacts on the environment and how
and to what extent they can be reduced. It is impossible to head
something off at the pass unless you know (1) that it's coming, (2)
what burdens it will place on your industry generally and your firm
specifically, and (3) in what ways it over- or understates appropriate
requirements. In short, while my topic concerns the ways in which
the regulatory scheme shapes environmental management, firms
should also be thinking of the ways in which environmental manage
ment can shape the regulatory scheme."
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Environmental regulations are nothing if not far-reaching. Es
sentially every type of discharge is subject to generally applicable
standards and/or specific permit requirements. Any manufacturing
operation will have to comply with a wide variety of regulatory stan
dards and obtain more permits than one would have thought possible.
This is not the forum to detail the substance of these requirements.'^
It is important, however, to understand their scope and the conse
quences of their violation.
A. Compliance
The extensiveness of environmental regulations can be glimpsed
by considering, for example, the regulations applicable to a new
waste-to-energy incinerator. Under the Clean Air Act alone, the in
cinerator must comply with (1) EPA's New Source Performance
Standard (NSPS) for incinerators, which imposes emission limits for a
half-dozen pollutants, regulates operating practices, and sets out fairly
•3 The necessity of complete information and understanding of environmental aspects of a
company's operations is implicit, for example, in discussions of how to influence EPA
rulemaking. See, e.g., Eckert, Representing Prnate Clients in EPA Rulemaking, 1 NAT. RE
SOURCES & ENV'T 27 (1985); Stein, EPA Administrative Rulemaking: A View from the Outside,
1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 33 (1985).
For full treatments, see F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATISE (1986), and W.
ROOGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1988). For a sketchy but able summary, see R. FINDLEY
& D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1988).
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extensive sampling, monitoring, and reporting requirements,'' (2) the
NSPS for steam-generating units,'® (3) depending on the type and
amount of fuel used by the auxiliary burners, the NSPS for fossU-fuel
burning units," (4) requirements for reporting monitoring data (col
lected pursuant to requirements in the NSPSs themselves) to EPA,'®
(5) the terms of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit"
(which will include, at a minimum, "best available control technol
ogy" emission limits for the dozen-plus pollutants regulated under the
Clean Air Act^° and a set of monitoring requirements,^' and to obtain
which the permittee must have provided a year's worth of ambient air
monitoring data^^), (6) if the facility is in a nonattainment area, the
terms of the New Source Review or nonattainment permit^' (which
will include emission limit(s) based on the lowest achievable emission
rate for the nonattainment pollutant(s),^^ and to obtain which the per
mittee will have had to offiset emissions of the nonattainment pollutant(s)^' and demonstrate that all other facilities it owns are in
compliance with the Clean Air Act)," and (7) possible additional
emission limits under the federally mandated State Implementation
Plan." All of this is merely what is required by the Clean Air Act.
The many other relevant federal laws include, but are not limited to,
RCRA^® (which will govern ash disposal), OSHA" (workplace
safety), and the Clean Water Act'" (any dredge and fill during con
struction" or discharges in operation"); the range of state and local
" EPA Standards of Performance for Municipal Waste Combustors, 56 Fed. Reg. 5488
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.50a-.59a). As proposed, this new NSPS would also
have required a facility to bum only garbage reduced by 25% through the removal of recyclables. See 55 Fed. Reg. 52,190 (1989) (proposed rule).
EPA Standards of Performance for Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generat
ing Units, 40 C.F.R. § 60.40b-.49b.
EPA Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Steam Generators, 40 C.F.R. § 60.40.
18 40 C.F.R. § 60.7.
1^ A permit is required for any new "major emitting facility" to be constructed in an area
satisfying the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(aXl) (1988).
20 Id. § 7475(aX4).
21 Id. § 7414.
22 Id § 7475(eX2).
23 Id § 7502(bX6).
24 Id § 7503(2).
25 Id § 7503(1).
26 Id § 7503(3).
2' See generally id § 7410.
28 Id §§ 6901-6992k.
29 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
30 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
31 Id. § 1344.
32 Id § 1342.
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laws is equally broad.''
Although the current regulatory scheme is in may ways lax and
riddled with loopholes, there is no denying that it is complex, intru
sive, and far-reaching.''* Careful, detailed examination of both the
legal requirements and the company's actual operations is necessary
just to find out what requirements apply, let alone whether they are
being satisfied.
B. Penalties
There is more than a moral imperative behind the concern with
compliance. Administrative and civil penalties for noncompliance
can be severe. For example, violations of the Clean Water Act can
result in civil penalties of $25,000 per day" and administrative penal
ties of $10,000 per violation after an abbreviated hearing, or $10,000
per day (up to $125,000) after a full-fledged administrative hearing.'®
These figures are typical for the federal statutes.'^ Increasingly, civil
enforcement actions are resulting in penalties in the millions of dol
lars." Furthermore, penalties can be assessed not merely for failure
to adhere to the substantive standards, but also for violation of moni
toring and reporting requirements."
Nor is it just the government that a company must worry about.
The critical federal environmental statutes each create a cause of ac
tion for citizens enforcement suits.'*® These have been a potent en
forcement tool, leading to hefty penalties payable to the federal
government or to settlements under which funds are expended on en
vironmental projects.'**
^3 See generally RECYCLING & INCINERATION: EVALUATING THE CHOICES 246-67 (R.
Denison & J. Ruston eds. 1990).
^ Indeed, the cynic would point out that the greater the number of loopholes, the more
important is complete information in order to take advantage of them.
35 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
36 Id. § 1319(g)(2).
3t Civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation are also provided for by the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g), and TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(aXl).
38 See, e.g.. United States v. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind.
1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990) ($2.18 million RCRA penalty).
3' See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g); United States v. Crown Roll Leaf, Inc., 29 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 2025 (D.N.J. 1989) ($142,000 penalty for failure to respond to EPA information
requests under RCRA and CERCLA).
« See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Qean Air Act); 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (RCRA).
For example, in Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440
(D. Md. 1985), after the court made a finding of liability, the parties settled for a $1.5 million
payment to support local environmental projects, in addition to increased treatment and moni
toring. Oppenheimer, Humpty Dumpty, 10 AMICUS J. 14, 15 (1988).

1991]

FEDERAL REGULATORY MANDATE

1247

Finally, penalties for violation of regulatory requirements are not
only civil. The Department of Justice and the states have steadily
increased criminal prosecutions under the environmental laws.^^
C. Superfund
More than any other single statute, Superfund has created the
need for self-assessments. Because Superfund liabilities grow out of
past rather than present actions, they are especially likely to go unno
ticed unless a concerted effort is made to discover them. Indeed, the
Superfund shotgun is double-barrelled: it imposes liabilities that are
likely to be both enormous and hidden. The due diligence, or CERCLA compliance audit, has become a completely standard part of any
corporate or real estate purchase.*^ The only point I wish to make is
that it is not enough to ensure that new acquisitions do not have haz
ardous waste problems lurking beneath the surface. The Superfund
liabilities to worry about are not merely those a company may
purchase unsuspectingly, but those hidden on the property it already
owns. The threat of Superfund liabihty mandates at least a one-time
review of past disposal practices.
D. Direct Information Gathering Requirements
Regulatory standards do not create the need for self-assessment
only indirectly, via the need to comply, but also directly. Three sets
of requirements stand out.
First, any discharge permit ("discharge" broadly understood to
include discharges to all environmental media) will include monitor
ing and testing requirements.'" These are in essence explicit, albeit
limited, environmental auditing requirements. Many consider moni^2 See supra note 10.
^3 DeMeester, Practical Guidance for Due Diligence Environmental Auditing, 18 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,210, 10,215 (1988); Heller, Environment Tops List of Merger Woes,
CHEMICALWEEK, Feb. 7, 1990, at 14.
44 EPA'S monitoring requirements for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permits, for example, are set out at 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j). In addition, the permittee
must notify either the state environmental agency or the Regional Office of the EPA not only
of the monitoring results, but also of any changes in its discharges or any noncompliance
(within 24 hours). It must also, if possible, give ten days notice of any bypass of pollution
control equipment. These requirements obviously forbid simply getting the permit, setting up
the equipment, starting the system up, and then ignoring it. The 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act establish a Clean Water Act-like permit program for all air pollution sources
above a minimum size. 1990 Clean Air Act § 501 (West 1990) (new §§ 501-07). The permits
are to include monitoring requirements, § 504(c), and EPA is authorized to promulgate moni
toring regulations, § 504(b).
A facility may also have monitoring and reporting obligations apart from those included
in a permit. For example. Clean Air Act NSPSs, which presently operate independent of any
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toring and sampling requirements typically found in EPA permits to
be inadequate, and they are by definition limited to the particular ac
tivity being permitted.'^' They do at least directly require that some
attention be paid to actual discharges. Monitoring reports must, of
course, be accurate."*^
Second, requirements for the management of hazardous waste
are replete with record-keeping and reporting provisions. These in
clude the manifest system for tracking all shipments of hazardous
waste,"*' the requirement that all generators of hazardous wastes no
tify EPA of their existence and obtain an identification number,"*® the
mandated biennial report from hazardous waste generators detailing
the quantities and nature of hazardous waste generated, its disposi
tion, and eflForts to reduce its quantity,"*' the requirement that any per
son who owns or operates, or used to own or operate, a hazardous
waste disposal site notify EPA of the existence of that facility,"* and
the requirement that a person in charge notify the government of any
release of a hazardous substance'* or of any discharge of oil or haz
ardous substances onto the navigable waters of the United States."
Third, EPA may simply request information from a company
wholly apart from any pre-existing monitoring or reporting require
ment. Most of the pollution statutes give the agency broad authority
to obtain information. The Clean Air Act, for example, states that
"the Administrator may require any [regulated facility] ... to (A)
establish and maintain such records, (B) make such reports, (C) in
stall, use, and maintain such monitoring equipment or methods, (D)
sample such emissions ..., and (E) provide such other information as
he may reasonably require."" How far EPA can take this authority
has not been put to the test; the language is quite sweeping and the
agency itself deems it sufficient to enable it to require full-fledged envi
ronmental audits.'"* To date, the agency has not pushed this authority
permit scheme, all include testing requirements, the results of which must be reported to EPA.
40 C.F.R. § 60.7.
Van Cleve, supra note 2, at 1219.
46 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (criminal penalties for knowing false statements in re
ports and records required under the Clean Water Act).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(aX5), 6923(a), 6924(aX2); 40 C.F.R. § 262.20.
48 42 U.S.C. § 6930(a); 40 C.F.R. § 262.12.
49 42 U.S.C. § 6922(aX6); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.40-.43.
50 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
51 Id. § 9603(a); 40 C.F.R. § 302.
52 33 U.S.C. § 1321(bX5).
53 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1318(aXA) (essentially identical provision in
Clean Water Act).
54 Mugdan, EPA Policy on Environmental Auditing 3 (paper presented at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Sept. 17, 1990) (on file at Cardozo Law Review) (EPA "would have
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very far, but it is a potentially powerful tool, both to compel audits
and to obtain results of an audit a company has performed on its own
initiative.
Although EPA has not transformed its information gathering
powers into full-fledged audit requirements, EPA information re
quests must be taken seriously.'' Recently, EPA has pressed for in
formation hardest under CERCLA. Section 103(e) of CERCLA'
requires Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) to provide informa
tion on the substances they may have contributed to the site, the ex
tent of any release, and their ability to pay for a clean-up; section
104(e)" authorizes EPA to request such information. Many PRPs
have been less than forthcoming in responding to EPA's requests for
information. Penalties for failure to comply with a request can go as
high as $25,000 per day, and the agency has begun to bring enforce
ment actions.'®
E. Practical Benefits of Self-Policing
A company that becomes known to regulators for effective envi
ronmental management and a generally strong compliance record is
going to have fewer of those regulators on its back. To be sure, EPA's
auditing policy avoids any such guarantee. Ever wary about tying its
hands, EPA refused to promise reduced enforcement actions at facili
ties with environmental audit programs in effect. The Justice Depart
ment supports this view." Yet EPA's enforcement and penalty
policies do take into account overall compliance and any good faith
efforts to ensure compliance; effective environmental management is,
of course, behind good performance on both counts.®" Moreover, in
the real world, the trust and confidence of the regulators is extraordi
narily valuable. A strong compliance record and a sincere committhe authority, in appropriate circumstances, to unilaterally impose environmental auditing
programs upon regulated entities")55 For a helpful discussion of how to handle EPA information requests, see Price, Respond
ing to EPA Information Requests, 5 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 13 (1990).
56 42 U.S.C. § 9603(e).
57 Id. § 9604(e).
. „
58 See Four Companies Sued in "First Salvo" of EPA Drive on CERCLA Information Re
quests, 20 Env't Rep. (SNA) 1796 (Feb. 23, 1990). Inadequate responses to EPA information
requests under RCRA led to fines in United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d
685 (1st Cir. 1987), and United States v. Crown Roll Leaf, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2025
(D.N.J. 1989).
,
. .
59 As Deputy Assistant Attorney General George Van Cleve writes elsewhere in this issue:
"[A]ny reduction in enforcement efibrts or inspections for those who perform environmental
audits would eliminate the current incentive for them to perform effective audits and correct
deficiencies." Van Cleve, supra note 2, at 1224.
60 EPA Auditing Policy, supra note 1, § III.B.l, at 25,007.
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ment to dealing with any problems that do arise will go far to creating
such trust and confidence. Although EPA and DOJ insist on their
prosecutorial discretion and have properly refused to tie their hands,
that prosecutorial discretion will work in favor of the company that
has shown it takes compliance seriously. DOJ is reportedly at work
on a policy that may formally lighten the heavy hand of enforcement
on companies that conduct voluntary audits and take corrective
action.^'
Finally, should the government nonetheless bring a judicial or
administrative enforcement action, the company is way ahead of the
game if it is abreast of its own problems and is working to solve them.
Being surprised by an enforcement action is a prime case of reactive,
or nonexistent, environmental management, and it can hurt the com
pany badly. In a court of law or of public opinion, the company can
only answer the charges (whether true or false) if it is armed with
complete information on the nature and seriousness of the problem,
what has been done about it already, what remains to be done and at
what cost, and what the actual regulatory requirements are. Consider
one specific example: it is an affirmative defense to noncompliance
with a water discharge permit that the excessive discharges were the
result of an "upset," i.e., that the noncompliance was unintentional,
temporary, and caused by circumstances beyond the permittee's con
trol.®^ The burden of proof is on the permittee, who must show that
an upset occurred, identify its cause, and establish that it notified the
relevant officials and took remedial action." Without systems in
place to monitor discharges, respond to any problems immediately,
and record and report all that occurs, the upset defense will as a prac
tical matter simply be unavailable."
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1564, 1565 (Dec. 14, 1990) (interview with Assistant Attorney
General Richard Stewart). Congressional debate on the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments at
tempted to steer DOJ in that direction:
[T]he environmental benefits of [self-evaluations or self-audits] and prompt correc
tive action are substantial, and section 113 should be read to encourage self-evaluations and self-audits. . . . [I]n the course of exercising prosecutorial discretion
under the criminal provisions of subsection 113(c), the Administrator and the At
torney General of the United States should, as a general matter, refrain from using
information obtained by a person in the course of a voluntarily initiated environ
mental audit against such person to prove the knowledge element of a violation of
this Act if [the person transmitted the information and corrected the violation].
Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers, S. 1630, 136 CONG. REC. S16,933, S16,951
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). See also 136 CONG. REC. S16,991 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (state
ment of Sen. Nickles).
62 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(n).
63 Id.
6* Where the government does bring a successful enforcement action, audits may be part of
the remedy. EPA first included an environmental auditing provision in a consent decree in
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III. PERMIT APPLICATIONS AND RENEWALS

In any situation where the regulated entity must apply for a per
mit, and there are many, the need for complete and accurate environ
mental information is especially pronounced. First, the grant of a
permit by a federal agency is an "action" to which NEPA's Environ
mental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement applies.®' In theory, the
lead agency prepares the EIS.®® As a practical matter, the applicant
will do most of the groundwork and provide much of the information
for the EIS, which is likely to be actually prepared by a consultant.
The EIS will be more accurate and convincing if it is based on a thor
ough knowledge of the apphcant's other facilities or projects, and if
the avoidance of adverse environmental harms it promises are based
on an established track record of sound environmental management.
Moreover, the NEPA process begins not with the EIS but with the
Environmental Assessment (EA), which indicates whether an EIS is
necessary.®^ Unlike the EIS, the EA can be prepared by the applicant
1984. Mays, Environmental Audits: A New Enforcement Tool, EPA J., June 1985, at 26.
EPA's auditing policy explicitly notes that it will propose environmental audits in consent
decrees, in particular where the violations seem attributable to the lack or breakdown of an
environmental management system or suggest that there are more where those came from.
For recent examples of consent decrees with explicit environmental audit requirements, see
United States v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Servs., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1355 (M.D.
La. 1988) (RCRA enforcement action; company agrees to install computerized waste tracking
system, pay $2 million fine, give $500,000 to university for hazardous waste research, and
conduct comprehensive audit); Lodging of Consent Decree, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,694 (1990) ($1.5
million fine, schedule for compliance, and in-house compliance audit); Menominee Paper Co.,
et al.; Notice of Consent Decree in Clean Water Act Enforcement Action, id. at 24,943 (Clean
Water Act violation; company to pay $2.1 million fine, perform "comprehensive environmen
tal audit," and submit and implement a remedial action plan); Lodging of Consent Decree
Ptirsuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, id. at 10,707 (RCRA violation;
company to conduct audit and pay $1.55 million fine). See generally Van Cleve, supra note 2.
EPA and DOJ are not the only regulators to have obtained environmental audits in settle
ments. In a few cases the SEC has done the same where a company failed to disclose (or
apparently failed to appreciate) its potential environmental liabilities or the costs of complying
with environmental regulations. TTie best-known of these is In the Matter of U.S. Steel, Ex
change Act Release No. 34-16223, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) K 82,319
(Sept. 27, 1979). The SEC determined that U.S. Steel's environmental disclosures had been
inadequate in several respects, including the company's failure to disclose that it was facing
between $700 million and $1 billion in capital costs to comply with the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts. As part of the settlement, U.S. Steel agreed to hire an independent consultant to
perform a thorough study of the costs and means of coming into compliance. See also In re
Occidental Petroleum Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-16950, [1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) H 82,622 (July 2, 1980) (company agrees to determine and disclose
total cost of (1) compliance over following three years, (2) maximum civil penalties for non
compliance, and (3) third-party claims arising out of hazardous waste sites).
« 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4) (1990).
^ The regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality specifically require that either
the agency or a contractor chosen by the agency prepare the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c).
67 Id. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4(c), 1508.9.
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itself.^® Thus, the applicant's own eflforts in compiling and presenting
information on environmental impacts is central to the NEPA pro
cess. In fact, the entire NEPA process is itself a critical aspect of
environmental management. That is, it is a period in which the com
pany and regulators directly focus on the company's environmental
performance.®'
Second, whether or not an EIS is prepared, permit applications
and renewals'" require an extensive information base, including data
on and evaluations of past and expected future performance." Accu
racy in the application is critical for three reasons. First, false state
ments can lead to permit revocation. Second, overly optimistic
statements can lead to permit provisions with which the firm cannot
comply. At the very least, noncompliance means bad publicity and
difficult negotiations to change the provision; it may lead to outright
revocation of the permit. Third, a responsible corporate oflScer must
certify that the application was prepared under her supervision or di
rection and contains information that is true, accurate, and complete.
False certifications can lead to criminal penalties."
Finally, one specific indirect environmental audit requirement
arising out of the permit process bears mention. An applicant for a
Clean Air Act permit to build a new source in a nonattainment area
must demonstrate that its existing facilities are all in complete compli
ance with the Act." If taken seriously by the permitting agency, this
68 /<£ § 1506.5(b). For actions taken by the EPA, the agency itself prepares the EA. It
bases the EA, however, on an Environmental Information Document (EID) prepared by the
applicant. Id. § 6.105(b).
69 See generally F. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 147-56.
to Most operating permits require periodic renewal. Clean Water Act
Pf™?*
for example, are issued for fixed terms not to exceed five years. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(bXlXB)
(1988) (five-year maximum for state-issued permits); id.§ 1342(a)(3) (EPA-issued permits sii^
ject to tatru^ requirements as state-issued permits). Periodic permit renewal is itself a signifi
cant incentive for environmental self-assessments. A company that must apply for numerous
permit renewals should develop systems for (1) ensuring that renewal dates do not^ unn^
ticed, (2) generating the necessary documentation and data well in advance, and (3) using the
tamf background information as much as possible so as to avoid duplicated effort. ObtMing
permits is time-consuming, laborious, and, consequently, expensive. A 1982 EPA r^rt found
that applicants for PSD permits under the Clean Air Act spent from $6800 to $25,000 with aa
average of $15,000. Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysts of EPA s
EmiJions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 135 (1989). Given inflation nsmg costs,
and some incrfaims in regulatory requirements, those figure surely significantly understate
present costs. Anything that can streamline the application process is important to the
applicant.
....
71 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21(f), (g) (NPDES permit applications).
72 See, e.g.. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(c)(4).
. . ^
•
73 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3). Similar requirements exist at the state level. For example, Missis
sippi now requires that applicants for hazardous waste permits include information as to the
applicant's past compliance record. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1246 (Nov. 2, 1990).
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can be a heroic task, made much simpler if environmental auditing
and management programs are already in place.
IV. RISK COMMUNICATION

Several federal laws require corporations to generate and disclose
information about their activities with regard to the environment and
actual and potential environmental liabilities.'^
A. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
A more or less direct response to the Bhopal disaster, EPCRA
requires state and local governments to adopt response plans for
emergency situations involving chemical releases'' and seeks to en
sure that chemical risks are fully communicated to the pubhc.'^ The
second of these requirements, contained in Subtitle B, is in essence an
environmental auditing requirement. Companies producing or using
designated hazardous chemicals must provide state and local commit
tees and EPA with information about the chemicals, accident risks,
spills," and any actual releases of the chemicals.'® A.lthough the re
porting requirement applies only to designated chemicals, the desig
nations are broad, and reach many substances that are otherwise
wholly unregulated.
The company must file one-time reports (material safety data
sheets, or MSDSs") with state and local authorities-one for each des
ignated chemical it manufactures, uses, handles, or disposes.®" The
MSDS must fully describe the characteristics of the chemical, includ
ing its carcinogenicity and physical and health hazards, the primary
routes of entry, the permissible exposure limit, appropriate precau
tions, emergency and first aid procedures, and the name, address, and
74 I discuss below SARA Title III and the securities laws. One could add the Toxic Sub
stances Control Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988), to this Ust. As implemented. TSCA has
been primarily an information-generating statute under which chemical manufacturers must
test new substances and submit toxicity data to EPA. Enforcement of TSCA has been 1MS
than rigorous, but it at least nominally requires manufacturers to investigate and report on the
toxicity of the chemical substances they produce.
75 42 U.S.C. § 11003 (1988).
j
76 For a useful summary of EPCRA. see Burcat & Hoffman. 7%e Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of1986: An Explanation of Title III of SARA, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10.007 (1988).
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021. 11022.
78 Id. § 11004.
79 MSDSs predate EPCRA; they were already required by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration as part of an employee right-to-know program. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200 (1990).
80 42 U.S.C. § 11021.
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telephone number of the manufacturer.®' The company must also
submit, and update as necessary, information on the quantities and
locations of those chemicals at its facility.®^
Covered companies must also file an annual chemical release
form with EPA stating the amount of any of 329 toxic chemicals at
the facility, their method of disposal, and the amount that entered
each environmental medium annually.®^ This is perhaps the most
controversial aspect of EPCRA. Predictably, the new availability of
relatively complete information on chemical releases®'* has led to in
creased pressure for more stringent regulation, prompted voluntary
reductions, and caused significant concern over public health and
safety.
Companies should be aware that virtually all the information
submitted to government officials under EPCRA is expressly made
publicly available.®® Although the Act does provide some trade secret
protection,®^ it does not provide firms with all the protection they
might want.
B. Securities Laws
Publicly traded companies often must prepare and disclose infor
mation regarding environmental compliance and liabilities as part of
their obligation under the securities laws to disclose all information
relevant to investors' decisions. Disclosures must be made in a variety
of documents, the most important of which are the registration state
ment for publicly traded securities and the company's quarterly and
annual reports. Specific disclosure requirements are set out in Regu
lation S-K.®^
81 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g); H.R. REP. NO. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1985), re
printed in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2898 (describing contents of
MSDS); see also 42 U.S.C. § 11049(6) (defining "material safety data sheet" by reference to 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)).
82 42 U.S.C. § 11022.
83 Id. § 11023.
8'* The numbers were surprisingly high. The first full set of EPCRA filings showed, for
example, that more than 2.7 billion poimds of hazardous pollutants were emitted into the air in
1987. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2628, 2629 (Apr. 26, 1989).
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 11044 (in general), 11021(c) (MSDS's), 11022(e)(3) (inventory forms),
11023(h) (chemical release forms).
86 Id. § 11042.
87 17 C.F.R. § 229, especially § 229.101, .103, .303 (1990). See also Interpretive Releases
Nos. 33-6130, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,924 (1979) (environmental disclosure), and 33-6835, 54 Fed.
Reg. 22,427 (1989) (management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of
operations).
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1. Material Information
Item 101 requires companies to disclose circumstances in which
environmental regulations "may necessitate significant capital out
lays, may materially aflFect the earning power of the business, or cause
material changes in registrant's business." Companies must also dis
close any material "proceedings" under the environmental laws, i.e.,
the laws of any jurisdiction concerning discharges "or otherwise relat
ing to the protection of the environment."®®
a. Compliance Expenses
Companies must disclose material effects from the expense or
burden of complying with environmental laws over the next two years
and, to the extent material, beyond this period. This requirement ap
plies to any anticipated (not merely authorized) capital expenses, to
indirect costs of compliance, such as reductions in output or lost com
petitiveness, and to fines and penalties for noncompliance. For exam
ple, emitters of currently unregulated hazardous air pollutants that
are covered by the new Clean Air Act amendments will soon have to
estimate what installation of the "maximum achievable control tech
nology"®' is going to cost them.
b. Pending Proceedings
A company must disclose any pending administrative or judicial
proceeding arising under the environmental laws that is material. In
particular, it must disclose a proceeding that (1) is between private
litigants and involves a claim for damages and sanctions that exceed
10% of the company's consolidated assets, or (2) involves a govern
mental party and potential monetary sanctions, unless the company
reasonably believes any sanctions will be $100,000 or less.
c. Environmental Policy
No general rule requires a company to disclose its overall envi
ronmental policy. Any such disclosure a company does make must,
of course, be accurate. In addition, if the corporation does have a
policy, and that policy is likely to cost it money, the policy must be
disclosed. The example the SEC gives, drawn from the U.S. Steel
case, is a policy of cutting comers and resisting new requirements,
which is likely to lead to fines, penalties, or loss of business. Presuma
bly, the opposite is equally trae; that is, a company must disclose a
88 Release No. 33-5170, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,989 (1971); 17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
89 1990 Clean Air Act § 301 (West 1990) (new § 112(d)(2)).
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policy of super-environmental protection that will cost it more than
an investor might otherwise expect it to have to pay.
2. Management's Disclosure and Analysis
Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
("MD&A"), requires disclosure of, among other things, "known
trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties
that will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the regis
trant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way.'"° This
vague language may well apply to potential environmental liabilities,
particularly under Superfund. A recent Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) interpretive release gives the specific example of
designation as a PRP." Such designation would not require disclo
sure under item 101 as a "proceeding," but it would be a "known
uncertainty" probably requiring disclosure as part of the MD&A.
Precisely what environmental contingencies require disclosure under
this provision remains uncertain.'^
3. Summary
To satisfy the SEC disclosure requirements, which can go far be
yond anything required by the environmental laws themselves, firms
must develop detailed and accurate systems to gather information
about anticipated environmental expenses. For the SEC requirements
to function as they are supposed to, a publicly traded company must
be fully aware of its compliance status, the eflFect of its activities on the
environment, and the likelihood of future regulation.
In practice, the statements made to satisfy the SEC disclosure
requirements frequently seem empty, perfunctory, and vague. The
reader is often left with the sense that she has no greater knowledge of
lurking environmental liabilities than before she saw the disclosure.
This defect of actual disclosures is in part the reflection of strong in
centives in this context toward the vague and the optimistic. But it
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1).
91 Release Nos. 33-6835, 34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 (1989).
92 See generally Archer, McMahon & Crough, SEC Reporting of Environmental Liabilities,
20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,105 (1990).
93 The cynic, see supra note 34, might suggest that to be able to walk the fine line of empty
accuracy—avoiding misleading statements, saying nothing, giving an optimistic impression,
while still hewing to something that can be called "the truth" with a straight face—requires
especially in-depth knowledge of the true state of affairs. In this sense, the lack of specificity in
the actual disclosures, while defeating their stated purpose, enhances rather than reduces the
need for complete internal self-assessments.
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also underscores the very real difficulties with the concept of "disclo
sure" generally and with pinning down with any precision just what
environmental liabilities exist and just how they are likely to affect the
firm's business. Making that evaluation is the basic challenge of envi
ronmental management.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

I will conclude with some speculations as to what the future may
hold. As the environmental regulatory program changes in the years
ahead, the need and opportunity for effective environmental manage
ment will only grow.
A. Increasing Explicit Audit Requirements
It is likely that the future holds many more direct regulatory en
vironmental auditing requirements. The pending Environmental
Crimes Act''* is one indication of this trend. In addition, bits and
pieces of legislation with such requirements are appearing at the state
level. For example, the New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention
Act" and its implementing regulations'® impose comprehensive risk
management requirements on companies that produce or handle "ex
traordinarily hazardous" materials. Legislation has also been intro
duced in New Jersey that would require owners of industrial property
to undergo an annual audit by a certified environmental auditor."
While this proposal is not on the verge of passage, it is a sign of the
times.
At the federal level, discussion continues on the use of environ
mental audit requirements as part of consent decrees or administra
tive settlements.'® At present DOJ seems more interested in including
such provisions in settlements than does EPA, but the feds as a group
can be expected to continue to push ever more directly for corporate
environmental self-assessments."
94 H.R. 3641, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Proposed new 18 U.S.C. § 734 would require
after any felony conviction or second misdemeanor conviction under the Act the organi
zation be placed on probation and required to pay for an independent audit as a condition of
the probation. See Van Cleve, supra note 2, at 1239 (discussing this proposal and similar
proposals by the United States Sentencing Commission).
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-19 (West 1990).
96 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 7:31-1.1 to -6.4 (1990).
97 New Jersey Environmental Audit Review Act, Assembly No. 2315.
98 See supra note 64.
99 The possibility that the SEC might require routine environmental audits of all publicly
traded companies also continues to be discussed, although no specific proposal is on the table.
Kiesche, Facing Up to Hidden Liabilities. CHEMICALWEEK, Feb. 14, 1990, at 58.
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A corollary development is the increasing emphasis on risk com
munication and the public dissemination of information. Under con
temporary "information economics," the trend in both common and
statutory law is toward wide distribution of information so that the
electorate, the market, and the liability system can act on it.
This
tendency will only increase as the information age and the computer
age continue to prod each other along in push-me-pull-you fashion.
The days of keeping things quiet are behind us. Some firms have seen
the writing on the wall and gone EPCRA one better. Dow Chemical,
for example, has set up user-friendly computer systems in public li
braries that allow members of the public to access Dow's EPCRA
filings (and, of course, allow Dow to do a heavy piece of self-promo
tion). Under its "Product Stewardship Program," Dow has also vol
untarily transmitted risk information to its distributors and
customers.'"' Perhaps the day will come when all EPCRA informa
tion is in a freely accessible user-friendly computer data base.
In
any event, both the regulation and the politics of the future are likely
to compel ever greater environmental disclosure.
B. Self-Assessment in Place of Governmental Enforcement
A second nascent regulatory trend relevant to environmental
100 See generally Green, When Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatory and Common Law Pre
scriptions for Risk Communication, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (1989); Lyndon /n/ormation Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1795 (1989).
. , u „•
n
One example of a related information-based initiative is increased interest in labelling all
products according to environmental acceptability. See Comment, Disclosing the Environmen
tal Impact of Human Activities: How A Federal Pollution Control Program Based on Individual
Decision Making and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environmental Goals of the
I970's in the I990's, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 505 (1989) (proposing a scheme whereby EPA assigns
all consumer products a numerical Environmental Impact Index that would be placed on the
label). West Germany has a federally administered seal of approval for environmentally be
nign products (the Blue Angel), and such a scheme is not inconceivable here. The National
Association of Attorneys General has called for, and EPA and the FTC have begun work on,
national environmental labeling standards. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1211 (Oct. 26, 1990).
over, several private efforts, most notably the Green Seals project, are underway. See J. NAAR,
DESIGN FOR A LIVEABLE PLANET 305-06 (1990); Schwartz, Shopping for a Model Commu
nity, GARBAGE, May/June 1990, at 35. To qualify for any seal of approval or environment^
endorsement other than the one it gives itself, a company will of course have to develop and
share reasonably complete information on the environmental effects of its products' manufac
ture, packaging, and disposal.
i</ioao\r,».
101 BARAM, RISK COMMUNICATION AS A REGULATORY ALTERNATIVE 6 n.l5 (1989) (re
port to Administrative Conference of the U.S.).
• t. • i
102 EPCRA requires EPA to establish a data base containing "a national toxic chemical
inventory based on data submitted" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j) (1988). The Toxics
Release Inventory is publicly available on a computerized database through the National Li
brary of Medicine. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
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management is the increasing interest in self-regulation as an alterna
tive to government enforcement. Such an approach has been formally
adopted, to a limited extent, in areas as diverse as meat and poultry
inspection and the regulation of broker-dealers under the securities
laws. Its currency is illustrated by the fact that the Administrative
Conference of the United States recently issued a request for propos
als for a research project on this topic.A shift toward self-policing
is consistent with the last decade's emphasis on deregulation, a re
duced governmental role, limited agency resources, and decentralized
governmental authority. If present environmental self-assessments
and the new emphasis on environmental management can establish
companies' ability to monitor their own activities effectively, environ
mental protection would be a logical candidate for increased reliance
on self-regulation.
C. The New Environmental Regulation
The major current intellectual trend in environmental regulation
is the shift away from the command-and-control approach that char
acterizes the pollution statutes of the 1970s and toward a regulatory
scheme based on economic incentives and tradeable emission
rights.'®^ Although such programs remain few and far between, the
idea has finally made it out of university economics departments and
into the halls of power. Congress and EPA show increasing interest
in marketable permits, tradeable emissions rights, and offset-type pro
grams. Examples include EPA's regulations phasing down
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production as required by the Montreal
Protocol,'"' the bubble policy under the Clean Air Act,'"® and the
•03 Administrative Conference of the United States, Possible Administrative Conference
Research Projects, Item 13 ("Use of Audited Self-certification") (distributed August 1990) (on
file with the Cardozo Law Review).
104 See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRON
MENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977); Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
105 40 C.F.R. pt. 82 (1990). These regulations allocate production and consumption al
lowances according to actual levels as of 1986. Id. § 82.6-.7 The allowances are reduced to
80% of the original amount in 1993 and 50% in 1998. Id. § 82.7. The critical, and novel,
aspect of the scheme is that the allowances are tradeable. Id. § 82.12. In theory, the result will
be that, as CFC use is forcibly reduced, there will be an economic incentive to develop substi
tutes while the remaining permissible supply will flow to the highest value uses. EPA Protec
tion of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,567 (1988) (preamble to final rule).
Subsequent international agreements and Subchapter VI of the Clean Air Act render these
regulations obsolete by completely phasing out production and consumption of these sub
stances by the year 2000. See 1990 Clean Air Act § 602 (West 1990) (new §§ 601-18); 55 Fed.
Reg. 45,134 (1990).
106 Under the bubble policy, which applies to several aspects of the Clean Air Act, emis-
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acid rain provisions in the recent Clean Air Act amendments.'"' To
the extent such a shift in regulatory approach in fact occurs, effective
environmental management will, for several reasons, be at a premium.
First, such programs are completely dependent on accurate and
complete information about discharges and operations. In part, this
means that direct requirements for keeping track of emissions will in
crease.'"® The CFG regulations, for example, involve a relatively
straightforward scheme of tradeable rights among a limited number of
companies, with easily monitored consumption of the allowances.
Nonetheless, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements are excep
tionally detailed.'"® Heightened regulatory requirements will not be
the only, or perhaps even the most important, spur to more thorough
monitoring and information-gathering, however. Additionally, each
participant in a scheme of tradeable emissions rights has a tremen
dous incentive to ensure complete and accurate monitoring by the
other participants in order to protect the value of its investment.""
Second, the strength of incentive-based regulatory schemes is the
flexibility they afford managers to achieve environmental goals in the
most efficient way. Precisely because the regulations do not specify a
complete and unbending set of requirements, managers will have to
determine the optimal approach for themselves. Managers who are
poorly informed, uninterested, or unimaginative will be unable to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by such regulatory schemes,
which rest on the premise that managers are engaged and inventive.
"[B]y explicitly valuing pollution control outputs, the substantial cre
ative ingenuity of entrepreneurial talents is harnessed in pursuit of
environmental quality improvement.'""
Finally, one aspect in particular of emissions trading schemes
makes an MBA more relevant than a JD: the incentive to reduce
sions increases from a new source of air pollution can be offset or "netted" by emissions de
creases from an existing source. If total emissions—what exits a vent in a hypothetical bubble
placed over both sources—do not increase, requirements for new sources are inapplicable. See
Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding use of bubble concept in
determining what qualifies as a new source in areas where air quality does not meet federal
standards).
107 1990 Clean Air Act § 401 (West 1990) (new §§ 401-16). The new provisions place facil
ity-specific caps on emissions of sulfur dioxide by electric utilities. Each utility will receive
from EPA allowances corresponding to its statutorily permissible emissions. Unused al
lowances may be banked for future use or transferred to another emitter.
108 Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 104, at 181-82.
109 See 40 C.F.R. § 82.13.
110 Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 104, at 182-83.
111 Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 223 (1988).
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emissions as far as economically possible."^ Giving prices to dis
charge rights creates business opportunities; the greater the reduc
tions, the more money is saved and/or earned through the sale of
unneeded rights. These opportunities will reward eflFective environ
mental managers. Indeed, some have suggested that experience with
such programs has already led to employees responsible for pollution
control within a firm being given more respect and authority."^
D. Environmental Management and Pollution Prevention
If the watchword of environmental regulation in the 1990s is not
"marketable permits," it will be "pollution prevention.""'* Adminis
trator William Reilly arrived at EPA with a draft of new legislation
premised on pollution prevention ideas and abandoning the mediumspecific approach that characterizes the current regulatory morass."'
His predecessor had already established a Pollution Prevention Of
fice,"® and much of the attention the agency gave environmental au
diting five years ago seems now focused on pollution prevention.
At present, actual pollution prevention/recycling/waste minimi
zation requirements are minimal. RCRA does, however, require that
a generator of hazardous waste certify that it "has a program in place
to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of such waste to the
degree determined by the generator to be economically practica
ble.'"" It imposes a similar requirement in permits for on-site treat
ment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities."® This is an easy enough
thing to certify but a much harder thing to do. Nonetheless, these
"2 Incentive-based environmental regulatory schemes fall into two basic categories: (1)
"pollution taxes," or per unit charges for emissions, and (2) tradeable emission rights (that, in
the purest form of this scheme, are initially distributed by auction). The first scheme rests on
an educated guess about the reduction a given charge will achieve; it does not impose a specific
limit. The change creates an incentive for managers to reduce emissions to the point where an
additional dollar spent on reduction will save only a dollar in taxes, a point that will vary from
one facility to another and must be individually determined by each firm for itself. The second
scheme establishes a specific limit on the total amount of pollution, but leaves allocation
among polluters to the market. The participants must figure out whether it is cheaper to buy
emission rights or controls, and the possibility of selling unneeded emission rights becomes a
business opportunity.
113 Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 111, at 223.
114 See, e.g., EPA Pollution Prevention Policy Statement, 54 Fed. Reg. 3845 (1989) (pro
posed policy statement).
113 Actually producing this proposal has been plagued by difficulty and setbacks. Adminis
trator Reilly originally promised a draft by July 1989. That date came and went, and the
proposal seems completely stuck in the executive branch for now. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1205
(Oct. 26, 1990).
116 EPA Pollution Prevention Policy Statement, supra note 114, at 3847.
117 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b).
118 W. § 6925(h).

1262

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1241

requirements, though meager, are likely a sign of things to come.
EPA has shied away from recommending or imposing a flat sourcereduction requirement in the hazardous waste setting."® It is increas
ingly interested, however, in extracting pollution prevention programs
in settlement of enforcement actions.In addition. Congress re
cently passed a sketchy pollution prevention act,"' and state waste
minimization initiatives are proliferating."^
While the regulatory consequences of the new emphasis on pollu
tion prevention remain minor and as yet unclear, environmental regu
lation has already rendered pollution prevention an economic
mandate. Superfund liability and the tremendous cost of hazardous
waste disposal under RCRA have been the leading forces prompting
waste minimization."^ But across the board the increasing expense of
complying with increasingly stringent standards has finally begun to
make people realize that complex end-of-the-pipe controls may cost
more to purchase, operate, and maintain than would a change in proBlomquist, Beyond the EPA and OTA Reports: Toward a Comprehensive Theory and
Approach to Hazardous Waste Reduction in America, 18 ENVTL. L. 817, 841-44 (1988); Folkerts & Eby, A Federal Perspective on Waste Minimization, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 295
(1988).
120 See, e.g., 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 364, 365 (June 22, 1990) (reduction of fine by $42,000 in
exchange for pollution prevention project).
121 In the waning hours of the 101st Congress, The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 snuck
into The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 6601-10, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990). This legislation is primarily directed at data collection and technical assist
ance; it does not impose direct regulatory requirements.
122 Thirty-five states now reportedly have programs or legislation dealing with waste reduc
tion. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 364, 365 (June 22, 1990) (attributing this figure to EPA Deputy
Administrator Henry Habicht). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.317 (Supp. 1990) (grant pro
gram); GAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25244.12-.25 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0908 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (generators must develop reduction plans for
state approval); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 453.402, 465.003-.034 (Supp. 1990). For a now somewhat
out-of-date discussion of state laws, as well as a proposal for new legislation, see Note, Legal
Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach to Hazardous Waste Manage
ment, 95 YALE L.J. 810, 821-31 (1986).
*23 Many companies claim to have made tremendous reductions in hazardous wastes gener
ation. See, e.g., EPA, WASTE MINIMIZATION: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY WITH ECONOMIC
BENEFITS (1987) (various success stories) [hereinafter EPA, WASTE MINIMIZATION]; U.S.
CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE (SUMMARY) 40 (1986) (reporting the following percentage reductions: Rohm & Haas,
10% from 1984 to 1985; Exxon Chemical Americas, the same; Du Pont, 50% and 35% for
two divisions from 1984 to 1985; 3M, 50% from 1975 to 1985); Company Solutions, INSTITU
TIONAL INVESTOR (Special Issue: Financing the Environment Forum) 21 (1990) (R. Morrow,
Chairman of the Amoco Corp., asserts that Amoco has reduced production of hazardous
waste by 87% since 1983; R. Mahoney, Chairman and CEO of Monsanto Co., claims reduc
tions in toxic air emissions of 36-38% since 1988 and anticipates 90% reduction by 1992). My
own view is that many of these specific numbers must be taken with more than a grain of salt.
Still, companies have made significant reductions in hazardous waste generation and doing so
has been in their economic and public relations interest.
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duction techniques.'^'*
Pollution prevention is the classic example of a task that requires
effective and informed environmental management. It will not hap
pen by itself. A firm must have someone who is aware of the goal and
has the mandate and the information-gathering tools necessary to
meet it.'^' For a company with effective environmental management,
the increasing emphasis on pollution prevention will be an opportu
nity, not a burden.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mine has been an easy task: to show how the existing federal
regulatory scheme directly and indirectly requires companies to in
form themselves about their environmental performance and meet
any problems head-on. A company cannot flourish under existing re
quirements without corporate systems that will gather comprehensive
environmental information and then act on it. While this is emphati
cally true under the regulatory scheme in place today, it will only be
more so tomorrow.
124 E.g., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 123, at 5 (F. Popoff, President and CEO of
Dow Chemical Co., asserts that in the past two years its Louisiana Division spent more than
$12 million on 47 waste reduction projects, which paid for themselves in an average of 10
months).
.
.
125 One part of a corporate waste minimization or pollution prevention program is a waste
mmimiyatinn audit. A Variation or aspect of a standard environmental audit, such an investi
gation identifies emissions of concern, analyses the cost and feasibility of substitutions or pro
cess modifications, and evaluates the progress of waste minimization programs already m
place. See EPA, WASTE MINIMIZATION, supra note 123, at 8-11; Blomquist, supra note 119,
at 848-49 & n.l33.

